It is well known that the covariance structure of the data alone is not enough to identify an SVAR, and the conventional approach is to impose restrictions on the parameters of the model based on a priori theoretical considerations. This paper suggests that much can be gained by requiring the properties of the identi…ed shocks to agree with major economic events that have been realized. We …rst show that even without additional restrictions, the data alone are often quite informative about the quantitatively important shocks that have occurred in the sample. We propose shrinking the set of solutions by imposing two types of inequality constraints on the shocks. The …rst restricts the sign and possibly magnitude of the shocks during unusual episodes in history. The second restricts the correlation between the shocks and variables external to the SVAR. The methodology provides a way to assess the validity of assumptions imposed as equality constraints. The e¤ectiveness and limitations of this approach are exempli…ed with three applications. JEL: C13, C18, C26, C36
Introduction
A challenge in economic analysis is that the data represented by a vector autoregression (VAR) can be consistent with many causal structures di¤erentiated by distinct economic models and primitive assumptions. Structural vector-autoregressive models (SVARs) provide a simple framework that enables researchers to perform counter-factual experiments without fully characterizing all primitives or micro-foundations that lead to the dynamic system. Concisely stated, a n-variable SVAR analysis consists of …nding an n n matrix B that relates the reduced-form innovations t to the mutually uncorrelated structural shocks e t : t = Be t :
The data provide t , but the above relationship only gives n(n+1)=2 pieces of information about B through the reduced-form covariance restrictions. Hence n(n 1)=2 additional restrictions are necessary to identify B. Sims (1980) originally proposed a triangularized system to identify B, but long-run economic restrictions, statistical restrictions based on heteroskedasticity of the VAR innovations, or additional information in the form of high frequency data, variables external to the SVAR, or narrative descriptions have also been employed. 1 Point identi…cation exists if these restrictions are enough to yield a unique solution. In some cases, point identi…cation is achievable only by imposing restrictions that are di¢ cult to defend. It may then be desirable to abandon the goal of point identi…cation in favor of less restrictive economic assumptions.
In this paper we are concerned with applications for which economic restrictions that permit point identi…cation are not available. Though the literature has focused on …nding n(n 1)=2 restrictions by appealing to theory or prior information, what seems to have been overlooked is the information conveyed by the n(n + 1)=2 atheoretical restrictions. Though they only provide an under-identi…ed set of solutions, the distribution of shocks in this set is telling about the events that might have happened, and is a useful guide to the additional restrictions that need to be imposed. Unlike a typical SVAR which puts restrictions on the dynamic responses or propagating mechanism, we put restrictions on the shocks. For this reason, we refer to our approach as a "shock-restricted"SVARs.
Although many types of shock-based restrictions are possible, we focus here on two main types. The …rst is a set of inequality restrictions that require the identi…ed shocks to have defensible properties during special episodes of history for which a broad historical understanding would suggest a certain behavior of the structural shocks. Historical narratives are augmented and veri…ed by using the data to locate distinguishing characteristics of the structural shocks.
We refer to these as event inequality constraints. The second are a set of inequality restrictions that require the identi…ed shocks to exhibit a non-zero correlation with certain variables exter-1 For a comprehensive review of SVAR models, see Ramey (2016) , Kilian and Lutkepohl (2016) .
nal to the VAR that should be informative about the shocks of interest. We refer to these as external variable inequality constraints. Many restrictions used in econometric modeling can be written as external variable equality constraints. We weaken these assumptions by allowing for inequalities.
The use of inequality constraints has a long history in the SVAR literature. They have predominantly been formulated as sign restrictions on impulse responses with zero as the threshold value, e.g., Uhlig (2005) . We entertain inequality constraints on the shocks, either on their behavior during particular episodes or in terms of their comovement with external variables, possibly with non-zero thresholds. Large threshold values allow us to isolate and exploit the information in rare events. Working with inequalities comes at the cost of foregoing point iden-ti…cation, but the approach nonetheless enables us to check whether shocks thought to have happened can be recovered under the assumptions of the model. The approach also allows us to evaluate whether assumptions such as exogeneity, zero, and unit elasticity, or others are valid.
The methodology described here is predicated on the idea that a credible identi…cation scheme should produce estimates of e t that are congruent with our ex-post understanding of historical events and/or with broadly accepted economic notions of a shock's de…ning properties. For example, a scheme that identi…es a large positive output shock in the 1982 recession would be dismissed because the existence of a shock would be hard to defend given the historical account of the events at the time. Similarly, a scheme that produces uncertainty shocks that are negatively rather than positively correlated with the value of safe haven assets would be dismissed given an economic understanding of uncertainty as a phenomenon that enhances rather than weakens precautionary motives. Such shock-based restrictions turn out to be valuable for identi…cation because, although two feasible structural models B andB will generate shocks e t andẽ t with equivalent …rst and second moments, the e t andẽ t are not necessarily the same at any given t or in terms of their comovement with external proxy variables. In other words, two series with equivalent properties "on average"can still have distinguishable features in certain subsamples and/or in their comovement with external variables.
At a super…cial level, the shock-based constraints appear similar to identi…cation schemes already present in the literature. Many important studies have used a narrative approach to construct shock series from historical readings of political and economic events. These shock series are typically used in an SVAR context as an external instrumental variable. A recent literature pioneered by Mertens and Ravn (2013) and Stock and Watson (2008) has emerged that uses economic time series external to the SVAR to help with identi…cation. These approaches achieve point identi…cation by assuming that the external variables have a zero correlation with some shocks (an exogeneity assumption) and is strongly correlated with other shocks (a relevance assumption). By contrast, as in Conley, Hansen and Rossi (2012) , our methodology allows the external variables and events to exhibit departures from exogeneity. But while their approach is Bayesian and focuses on single equation estimation, our approach is frequentist in the spirit of the moment inequality framework of Andrews and Soares (2010) and focuses on system estimation. And unlike Conley et al. (2012) , the motivation for the event and external variable inequality constraints considered here is not limited to relaxing exogeneity assumptions;
the more general objective is to use them to help with identi…cation. Like any identi…cation scheme, the one studied here is not without limitations. While the approach often allows for weaker assumptions, clear conclusions may not emerge without the imposition of multiple shock-based restrictions, each of which need to be located and defended.
This in turn requires a detailed reading of the relevant events. Moreover, alternative combinations of these constraints, as well as alternative parameterizations of a given set of constraints, may produce di¤ering results. In such cases, a sensitivity analysis may be undertaken to reveal how fragile the …ndings are to di¤erent identifying assumptions.
In what follows, we demonstrate how the methodology can be used with three applications. In the …rst, building o¤ of previous work by Kilian (2008) and Kilian and Murphy (2012) , we use an SVAR for the oil market to illustrate how to set up the restrictions and obtain a set of plausible solutions. It is shown that, even though the dynamic responses under di¤erent restrictions are similar, some shocks thought to have occurred in particular episodes are not actually evident under restrictions previously used in the literature. In the second application, we consider the SVAR used in Gertler and Karadi (2015) to assess the transmission of monetary policy shocks. Results using our shock-based restrictions broadly support their assumption about instrument exogeneity, but reveal that periods of monetary easing are the source of the identifying power. Finally, inspired by the work of Mian and Su… (2014) , we use a bivariate SVAR to estimate the macroeconomic e¤ects of ‡uctuations in housing wealth on aggregate consumption. We …nd that much can be said about these e¤ects even in the absence of a credibly valid instrument, and that the shock-based restrictions produce tighter bounds than competing methods in the literature. A fourth example, given in Ludvigson, Ma and Ng (2019) and hereafter referred to as LMN, is used to distinguish …rst from second moment shocks, a problem for which theory o¤ers little guidance. These di¤erent applications illustrate how the event and external variable inequality constraints may be used together or separately, and possibly in conjunction with other identi…cation schemes that already exist in the literature.
A general …nding is that there is much to be gained by requiring the properties of the identi…ed shocks to agree with major economic events that have been realized. Often, the shock-based restrictions are rich enough to conclude that the data are consistent with a clear causal pattern among the variables. By contrast, the common approach of focusing exclusively on restricting the SVAR parameters to achieve identi…cation often misses valuable information about the structural shocks of interest. In some cases, the shocks implied by identi…cation schemes derived under conventional parameter restrictions appear implausible given an ex post understanding of major historical or economic events.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the econometric framework and the shock-based restrictions at a general level. Sections 3, 4 and 5 present an analysis of the three applications mentioned above. Section 6 concludes.
Econometric Framework
Let X t denote a n 1 vector time series. We suppose that X t has a reduced-form …nite-order autoregressive representation X t = P p j=1 A j X t j + t , t (0; ); = PP 0 where P is the unique lower-triangular Cholesky factor with non-negative diagonal elements. The reduced-form parameters are collected into = vec(A 1 ) 0 : : : vec(A p ) 0 ; vech( ) 0 0 . The reduced-form innovations t are related to the structural SVAR shocks e t by an invertible matrix H:
where B H , and is a diagonal matrix with variance of the shocks in the diagonal entries.
The structural shocks e t are mean zero with unit variance, serially and mutually uncorrelated.
We adopt the unit e¤ect normalization that H jj = 1 for all j.
The goal of the exercise is analyze the dynamic e¤ects of e t on X t . Let "hats" denote estimated variables. Since the autoregressive parameters A j can be consistently estimated under regularity conditions, the sample residuals^ t (^ ) are consistent estimates of t . The empirical SVAR problem reduces to …nding B from^ . But there are n 2 parameters in B and the sample covariance of^ t only provides n(n + 1)=2 < n 2 conditions g Z (B) in the form
where the operator vech( ) takes a symmetric n n matrix and stacks the lower triangular half into a single vector of length n (n + 1) =2. The VAR is therefore under-identi…ed as there can be in…nitely many solutions satisfying the covariance restrictions g Z (B) = 0. Let these uncountably many solutions be collected into the set
where O n is the set of n n orthonormal matrices. We shall refer toB as the unconstrained solution set for short, with the understanding that it is not completely unconstrained given the imposition of the covariance restrictions. To simplify notation, the dependence ofB on Q and is suppressed.
To construct the unconstrained solution setB, we initialize B to be the unique lowertriangular Cholesky factor of^ with non-negative diagonal elements,P, and then rotate it by K = 1:5 million random orthogonal matrices Q. Each rotation begins by drawing an n n matrix M of NID(0,1) random variables. Then Q is taken to be the orthonormal matrix in the QR decomposition of M. Since B =PQ, the procedure imposes the covariance restrictions vech( ) =vech(BB 0 ) by construction. Let e t (B) = B 1^ t be the shocks implied by a B 2B for given^ t . The moments implied by the covariance structure alone give us 1.5 million values of B, and thus 1.5 million unconstrained values of e t (B) for t = 1; :::T .
Researchers have used various types of restrictions to dismiss solutions inB leading to a smaller set that satis…es the additional identifying restrictions. A notable example is sign restrictions or more generally inequality restrictions of the form g S (B) 0. Existing theoretical and empirical work tends to place these constraints on the impulse response functions, i.e., in terms of X t = (L)Be t , the restrictions have focused on (L)B. Point identi…cation requires restrictions beyond the ones implied by the covariance structure to reduceB to a singleton.
Event Inequality Constraints
Event inequality constraints are unusual episodes of history in which a broad-based (historical and statistical) reading of the times would suggest a speci…c feature of the structural shocks.
The idea is that a credible identi…cation scheme should produce shocks that are not grossly at variance with our ex-post understanding of events, at least during periods of special interest.
Event inequality constraints put bounds k = k 1 ; :::; k E on the sign and magnitude of e t = B 1 t during selected episodes collected into a vector of E event dates = ( 1 ; :::; E ). That is, each "event" is associated with a speci…c date or dates in the sample. These shocks are useful for identi…cation because, from e t = B 1 t = Q 0 P 1 t , we see that forQ 6 = Q, e t =Q 0 P 1 t =Qe t 6 = e t at any given t. This implies that constraints involving the shocks at speci…c time periods in the sample could be used to constrict the number of solutions inB. To illustrate the point, consider the n = 2 case: where jBj = B 11 B 22 B 12 B 21 is the determinant of B. The values of 1 and 2 are given since we have data for event date in . Hence, a restriction on the behavior of e 1 1 at speci…c time 1 is a non-linear restriction on B, or equivalently, on Q. With non-Gaussian reduced-form errors, one can also see that the third and higher order moments of e 1t are not invariant to B, hence Q. This is in spite of the fact that the …rst and second moments of e t are invariant to Q. There is thus information in e t that can be used to identify B.
Several event inequality constraints may be represented as a system of inequality constraints on B: g E (e t (B); ; k) 0: This is tantamount to creating dummy variables from the timing of speci…c events, and then putting restrictions on their correlation with the identi…ed shocks. The motivation is that if a particular Q generates a shock series e t that is di¢ cult to defend in certain episodes, it can be removed fromB. Such constraints could be imposed on extraordinary events such as the major recessions, wars, and natural disasters that have been well-documented. For example, if the …rst shock (say to monetary policy) is presumed to be strongly contractionary in = (1979:10; 1979:11; 1979:12) , then one could formulate restrictions of the form
to dismiss solutions that imply highly expansionary monetary policy shocks in these episodes.
The parameter k 1 is a lower bound that re ‡ects how contractionary these shocks are thought to be and represents a maintained assumption of the identi…cation scheme, analogous to the zero restrictions of recursive identi…cation schemes. The i-th row of g Ei represents an inequality with 1 t= i as instrument. In essence, g E (B; ; k) de…nes conditions based on the timing, sign, and magnitude of the events to help identi…cation. Note that event inequality constraints put restrictions on the sign and the magnitude of e t (B) rather than on the signs of impulse responses, as is common in some SVAR approaches.
Of course, if k i is too big, or if the timing of the events in are inaccurate, the solutions will be meaningless even if they exist. On the other hand, if shocks are systematically found at particular episodes when no restrictions on the shocks are imposed, we can be more con…dent of their occurrence. Our approach is to construct the set of shocks inB implied by the covariance structure alone, and then examine the properties of the shocks in the periods for which the e it (B) are large. This is exempli…ed in the applications below.
In concurrent work, Antolín-Díaz and Rubio-Ramírez (2018) also suggest using restrictions on the shocks during certain episodes of history to help identi…cation in a Bayesian setting.
They entertain event restrictions that play up the role of some shocks while simultaneously playing down the role of others (e.g., their "Type A and B" restrictions), similar in spirit to the traditional narrative-external instrument approach. Our event inequality constraints only require the weaker assumption that the events be driven at least in part by one or more of the shocks; they do not require the remaining shocks to play smaller roles. Furthermore, they do not use external variables which play an important role in our approach, as we now discuss.
External Variable Inequality Constraints
When theory or economic reasoning imply that certain variables external to the VAR should be informative about the shocks of interest, such variables can also facilitate identi…cation. Similar to the event inequality constraints, restrictions involving the correlation between e t = B 1 t and external variables, can be used to constrict the number of solutions inB.
To be clear that external variables in this methodology are not necessarily valid instruments, we refer to the external variables presumed to have valuable information about the parameters of interest simply as S t . 'Valuable'is de…ned in terms of a lower bound on the unit-free correlation between S t and the identi…ed shocks, akin to the instrument relevance condition.
An example helps understand the motivation of these constraints. Consider a two variable model
where I 2 is a 2 2 identity matrix. The covariance structure = BB 0 provides three unique pieces of information, so one more restriction would be needed for point identi…cation. If an instrumental variable Z t exists such that (i) E[Z t e 1t ] = 0 (exogeneity) and (ii) E[Z t e 2t ] 6 = 0 (relevance), then a unique solution for B can be obtained.
Suppose that, instead of a valid external instrument Z t ; to use the terminology of Stock and Watson (2008) , we have an external proxy variable S t that is not assured to be exogenous and hence can be contemporaneously correlated with at least one structural shock. This suggests we could represent S t by
where e St is an S-speci…c shock uncorrelated with e 1t ; e 2t by assumption. We may want to discard solutions inB for which the absolute correlation between S t and e 2t is too small. The quantity
measures the correlation between the component S t and e 2 . Requiring that c(B) > c is the same as 2 2 + 2 + 2 S > c 2 , which is a non-linear constraint on the parameters of the S t equation, which are themselves functions of the shocks and data on S t . That c is between zero and one facilitates the parameterization of c.
External variable restrictions can be collected into a system of inequality constraints on B:
where c is a vector of lower bounds on the correlations between e t (B) and S. In many applications c can be close to but not exactly zero, thereby requiring that a shock merely be at least weakly correlated with S. For example, if the …rst shock (say to monetary policy) is presumed to be correlated with an external variable S t (say Fed fund futures), then one could formulate restrictions of the form g C (e t (B); S; c) = corr (e 1t ; S t ) c 0:
Two points are worthy of emphasis. First, in conventional instrumental variable estimation, instrument exogeneity is a maintained assumption. By contrast, our approach makes no such exogeneity assumption. We only assert that the external variables be driven at least in part by one or more of the shocks, thereby allowing us to narrow the set of solutions but not achieve point identi…cation. Of course, S t itself is a valid exogenous instrument if = 0. But when validity of the exogeneity assumption is questionable, then S t is at best plausibly exogenous in the terminology of Conley et al. (2012) . These authors consider estimation of the equation for X 1t with endogenous regressor X 2t when instrument exogeneity is not known to hold exactly, but the parameter is point identi…ed when the exogeneity assumption is valid. They put bounds on the e¤ect due to the invalid instrument, or what we refer to as S t , on X 1t . In contrast, we analyze X 1t and X 2t jointly, and we put more structure on the role of S t so that a lower bound can be placed on its relevance for the shock or shocks of interest. Like Conley et al. (2012) , such a bound will not, in general, be enough to achieve point identi…cation. But it could dismiss solutions that do not achieve this bound, akin to dismissing weak instruments. Second, as in the external instrumental variable literature, a maintained assumption of the external variable inequality constraints is that the random processes behind the external variables are determined outside of the VAR system. External variables S t are then well suited to help with identi…cation whenever they are informative about the shocks of interest, while the research question is not concerned with their behavior per se. Otherwise they should be included in the SVAR system rather than used extraneously, which means they cannot be utilized to help with identi…cation in the subsystem that excludes S t .
Overview
In the applications below, the event and external variable inequality constraints are used individually or jointly, and possibly in conjunction with other types of restrictions, such as conventional sign restrictions on the IRFs. Suppose estimates of B are required to satisfy all such restrictions for a given application. The constrained solution set is de…ned by
where g Z (B) = 0 is the collection of covariance structure restrictions, g S (B) 0 is a set of sign and other restrictions on the IRFs, g E (e t (B); ; k) 0 is the set of event inequality constraints, and g C (e t (B); S) 0 is the collection of external variable inequality constraints. To simplify notation, we simply write B(B; k; ; ; S) as B. A particular solution can be in bothB and B only if all these restrictions are satis…ed. Though B is still a set, it should be smaller thanB, which is based on the covariance restrictions alone. The additional identi…cation restrictions that lead to B explicitly recognize that not every solution inB is equally credible.
Few methods are available to evaluate the sampling uncertainty of set identi…ed SVARs from a frequentist perspective, and these tend to be speci…c to the imposition of particular identifying restrictions. Granziera, Moon and Schorfheide (2018) suggest a projections based method within a moment-inequality setup, but it is designed to study SVARs that only impose restrictions on one set of impulse response functions. Gafarov, Meier and Montiel-Olea (2015) suggest to collect parameters of the reduced-form model in a 1
Wald ellipsoid but the approach is conservative. For the method to get an exact coverage of 1 , the radius of the Wald-ellipsoid needs to be carefully calibrated. As discussed in Kilian and Lutkepohl (2016) , even with these adjustments, existing frequentist con…dence sets for set-identi…ed models still tend to be too wide to be informative. It is fair to say that there exists no generally agreed upon method for conducting inference in set-identi…ed SVARs, let alone one proven to have correct frequentist coverage properties for shock-restricted SVARs of the type considered here.
We therefore use a bootstrap Monte Carlo procedure to assess the sampling error of our inequality restrictions when S t are variables external to the SVAR. The Online Appendix describes a Monte Carlo simulation that bootstraps from the e t (B) shocks for the X t system to create con…dence bands for impulse responses. These bootstrap standard errors are reported in several …gures below.
We now turn to three SVAR studies to illustrate the potential usage of shock-based restrictions in particular applications.
Application 1: An Empirical Analysis of the Oil Market
In this section we consider an SVAR model of the oil market based on Kilian (2009) and Kilian and Murphy (2012) (KM hereafter). The objective of these studies is to determine the role of oil supply versus oil demand in driving volatility in oil price changes. These authors consider an SVAR with three variables: X t = prod t rea t rpo t 0 where prod t is the percentage change in global crude oil production, rea t is the global demand of industrial commodities variable constructed in Kilian (2009) , and rpo t is the real oil price. Kilian (2009) refers to rea t simply as a variable that measures "aggregate demand,"for commodities in general, a concept to be distinguished from an oil market speci…c demand. The three structural shocks of interest to oil supply shock, aggregate demand shock, and to oil-speci…c demand shock. These are collected into the vector e t , which is related to the reduced-form errors t through 0 @ prod;t rea;t
Motivating Facts
Much has been written about the correlation between oil prices and geopolitical as well economic events. See, for example, Hamilton (2013) and Baumeister and Kilian (2016) for recent reviews.
An extensive narrative history of big economic events in the oil market can also be found in Kilian and Murphy (2014) (KM2). However, their causal relations and more precisely the relative importance of the sources of ‡uctuations in the oil market is still a matter of debate. suggests that the large oil price changes are partly attributable to oil supply shocks, we would expect a spike of the appropriate sign in the structural e prod;t shock during these episodes. Therefore, we turn to the unconstrained setB to see whether the data identify these as large oil supply shock events.
Searching over the 1.5 million rotations inB, we …nd that the date in our sample with the most minima in the oil supply shock e prod;t (i.e., largest negative oil supply shock) is 1990:08, the month of the Kuwait invasion by the U.S. The date with the most maxima for e prod;t (i.e. largest positive oil supply shock) is 1986:02, following the collapse of OPEC. These …ndings are consistent with the hypothesis that the large spikes in the oil price during these months were at least partly attributable to oil supply disruptions. At the same time, KM2 have argued that the oil price increase in 1990:08 was caused by both a negative oil supply shock and a positive oil-speci…c demand shock. We therefore repeat the search over rotations inB for the oil speci…c demand shock e rpo;t . Consistent with the arguments in KM2, the date with the most maxima in e rpo;t across all 1.5 million rotations inB is again 1990:08, the month of the Kuwait invasion by the U.S. In addition, we …nd that the date with the most minima of e rpo;t is 1986:02, following the collapse of OPEC. Thus, the covariance structure of the data alone provides overwhelming evidence of both large oil supply and oil-speci…c demand shocks in the months 1990:08 and 1986:02, respectively. As observed by KM2, the collapse of OPEC in early 1986 was preceded by an announcement in late 1985 by Saudi Arabia that it would no longer attempt to prop up the price of oil by reducing its oil production. According to the historical evidence presented in KM2, the actual supply disruption that created a major positive shock to the ‡ow supply of oil around the OPEC collapse took place over several months between 1985:12 and roughly 1986:06, and was accompanied in the short run by lower storage demand as oil price expectations fell. The historical account given in Hamilton (2013) generally agrees and argues that the Saudi's "ramped up" production around this time, leading to a positive "oil supply shock for producers." This suggests that the OPEC collapse may be better characterized as a sequence of positive oil supply shocks between 1985:12 and 1986:06, rather than a single shock in one month. Kilian (2008) provides an "exogenous oil supply shock"external variable series that measures shortfalls in OPEC oil production associated with wars and civil disruptions. This indicator is used as an external instrument for point identifying oil price shocks in Montiel-Olea, Stock and Watson (2015) (MSW). Production shortfalls would be a valid instrumental variable if it were uncorrelated with the two demand shocks e rea;t and e rpo;t . The assumption was used in MSW to point identify oil supply shocks e prod;t in the above SVAR. But the variable could be an imperfect indicator of actual production shortfalls and measurement error is possible. Furthermore, some have argued that oil production shortfalls are at least partly caused by political events such as wars or embargoes that could have direct implications for oil demand (e.g., Hamilton (2013) ). Yet, even if the shortfall series is not truly exogenous with respect to the two demand shocks, it may still be relevant for oil supply shocks. Our approach is to use the information in the shortfall variable by exploiting its correlation with the oil supply shock but without insisting on zero correlations with the two oil demand shocks.
Shock-Based Constraints
With this background in mind, we now consider several di¤erent combinations of restrictions to aid with identi…cation. These are summarized in Table 1 below. The row labeled g Z = 0 denotes a weak set of constraints based on the covariance restrictions alone. Kilian (2009) combines the covariance restrictions with traditional sign restrictions on the impact impulse response functions. This combination of restrictions is referred to as the K09 restrictions in Table 1. KM combine the K09 restrictions with restrictions on certain combinations of parameters in the B matrix that place upper bounds on the ratios B 13 B 33 and B 12 B 32 . 2 Results from these combined restrictions are used to form a basis of comparison with our distinct shock-based restrictions and are labeled KKM in Table 1 .
Next we consider adding both event inequality constraints g E 0 and external variable inequality constraints g C 0 to help with identi…cation of oil supply versus aggregate and oil demand shocks. These are combined with the covariance and K09 sign restrictions and labeled SEE in Table 1 . Event inequality constraints are summarized by g E 1 and g E 2 in row SEE of the table. Constraint g E1 requires both a large negative oil supply shock and a large positive oil-speci…c demand shock in the month of the Kuwait invasion. Speci…cally, constraint g E 1 requires that the e prod; 1 found in period 1 of August 1990 be small and less than k 1 standard deviations below the mean and that the e rpo; 1 be large and exceed k 2 standard deviations above the mean. Constraint g E 2 requires both positive oil supply and negative oil-speci…c demand shocks during the OPEC collapse. Speci…cally, the constraint requires the cumulation of e prod;t in 2 = [1985:12; 1986 :06] to be non-negative, which is to say that their sum must be above average, and the cumulation of e rpo;t in 2 = [1985:12; 1986 :06] to be non-positive, which is to say that their sum may not be above average. The restrictions labeled SEE and SEE(a)-SEE (d) set di¤erent values for the threshold parameters k = k 1 ; k 2 0 and will be discussed below.
Note that there is nothing in the event inequality constraints that explicitly precludes the presence of the global demand shock e rea;t from playing an important role in these episodes.
Nor is there anything that restricts the relative importance of the three shocks in any particular episode. The event inequality constraints merely require that oil supply and oil-speci…c shocks played some role in the price spikes of these episodes, where the magnitude and sign of that role are determined by the parameters k 1 and k 2 .
The external variable inequality constraints are summarized as g C 0 in row SEE of Table   2 KM interpret the restrictions on the ratios B13 B33 and B12 B32 as restrictions on elasticities of oil supply to demand shocks. There is, however, disagreement about whether these particular restrictions isolate the relevant elasticities (see the debate between Baumeister and Hamilton (2019) and Kilian (2019) ). We take no stand on the interpretation of these restrictions and instead merely implement the same restrictions used in KM solely to form a basis of comparison with the shock-based restrictions of this paper. [1985:12; 1986 :06] (OPEC collapse)
Notes: The table summarizes restrictions in di¤erent constrained solution sets. q (x) refers to the percentile value of x.
1. We use the "oil production shortfall" series constructed by Kilian (2008) and denoted OS t as our S t . 3 The constraint requires that any oil supply shocks e prod;t (B) formed from B 2B be negatively correlated with OS t , implying that production shortfalls resulting from wars and embargoes coincide with decreases in e prod;t , or negative oil supply shocks.
Finally, the restrictions labeled MSW describe the constraints used in MSW to point identify oil supply shocks e prod;t in the above SVAR. These restrictions assume OS t is a valid external instrument and we therefore label it Z t in that case. MSW are concerned that OS t could be a weak instrument. By contrast, the SEE constraints do not treat OS t as a valid instrument, but nonetheless assume that it is relevant for supply shocks.
Results for the Oil SVAR
We use the same data used in Kilian (2009) and the largest common sample period across Kilian (2008) and Kilian (2009 Kilian ( ) (1973 Kilian ( :02-2004 :09) for the analysis. Following KM, we use p = 24 lags in the VAR to capture the long swings in the oil market. After losing observations to lags and di¤erencing, the estimation sample is 1975:02 to 2004:09. We study the dynamic causal e¤ects and propagating mechanisms of the shocks under di¤erent constraints and parameterizations using impulse response functions. All …gures show responses to one standard deviation shocks in the direction that raise the price of oil. shock have been eliminated by the KM restrictions on B 13 B 33 and B 12 B 32 . Instead, the aggregate demand shock e rea;t has large e¤ects on the price of oil, both in the short-and long-run. Some KKM solutions also imply that the oil-speci…c demand shock e rpo;t has quantitatively large e¤ects on oil price changes, but the upper and lower bound of the responses to this shock are much wider and thus the …ndings in this regard are less conclusive.
We now consider the SEE restrictions which replace the KM restrictions with, sign, event, and external variable inequality constraints. To implement these restrictions, we need to set parameters of the event inequality constraints k = k 1 ; k 2 0 . To do so, we return to the unconstrained setB to examine the observed magnitudes of the shocks in these episodes. As a start, we set k = k 1 ; k 2 0 equal to the 50th percentile values of e prod; 1 and e rpo; 1 inB in The …gure reports solution sets of impulse response to positive, one standard deviation shocks for system X t = ( prod t ; rea t ; rpo t ) 0 under KM, KKM, k 2 = q 50 (e rpo: 1 ), where we denote the percentile value of x as q (x).
MSW and SEE restrictions listed in
The IRFs associated with the SEE restrictions under the above parameterization of k are shown as grey shaded areas in the right panel of Figure 2 , along with 90 percent con…dence bands computed using a boot-strap sampling approach. Comparing results across the two panels, we …nd that the set of responses to the two demand shocks are tighter than those under the KKM restrictions, and preserve solutions that produce larger oil price responses to demand shocks of either type than to supply shocks. These results are similar qualitatively to those reported in KM. One di¤erence between the sets produced by the SEE constraints versus the KKM restrictions is that the range of responses to the oil supply shock under the SEE restrictions includes values that are somewhat larger than under the KKM restrictions, even though the e¤ects of oil supply shocks are still smaller than those of the demand shocks. The MSW point estimates give responses to oil supply shocks that fall outside the bounds of both the KKM and SEE solution sets.
All identi…cation approaches require assumptions, and it is important to check the sensitivity of the results to model assumptions. For the present application, the parameters k = k 1 ; k 2 0 stipulate when oil supply or oil-speci…c demand shocks during the Kuwait invasion are deemed big. To assess the sensitivity of the results the this parameterization, Figure 3 shows the IRFs under di¤erent four di¤erent values for these parameters. Case SEE(a) sets k 1 to the q 25 (e 1 ), 25th-percentile value of e prod;t inB at 1 while keeping k 2 at q 50 (e 3 ). Case SEE(b) sets k 1 to q 75 (e 1 ), the 75th-percentile value of e rpo;t inB at 1 , also keeping k 1 at the median value Its clear from the …gure that the results are not sensitive to the parameterization of the …rst event inequality constraint. Under all four parameterizations, positive shocks to both types of demand lead to a sharp increases in the price of oil that persists for many months, while the e¤ects of oil supply shocks are more muted. No matter which parameterization, the responses to the aggregate demand shock is bounded well away from zero as the horizon increases.
Properties of the Shocks
Although a stated objective of any SVAR analysis is to identify the structural shocks, the properties of the shocks are rarely scrutinized. By contrast, in the methodology here the shocks are of explicit interest, so we examine their properties. One property of interest concerns the normality of the shocks. The e prod;t identi…ed by imposing the SEE restrictions exhibit strong non-Gaussian features. Averaged across solutions, the coe¢ cient of skewness and kurtosis are 0:6102 and 5:4865, respectively. But the e prod;t series implied by the KKM restrictions exhibit even greater departures from normality, with an average skewness of 1:4603 and a kurtosis of 11:0722. The stronger departures from Gaussianity arises because the KKM constraints accept solutions that imply larger e prod;t shocks in some time periods.
To have a clearer picture of the properties of the shocks identi…ed by the SEE versus KKM restrictions, Figure 4 plots the timing of "large shocks" in both cases, where for the SEE restriction case we set k = k 1 ; k 2 0 equal to the 50th percentile values inB of the relevant shocks in 1990:08. For the purposes of the …gure, large shocks are de…ned to be those in excess of two standard deviations above (or below) the mean. In view of the non-normality of the shocks, the …gure also plots horizontal lines corresponding to three standard deviation of the unit shocks. The …gure reports the standard deviation of all such large shocks in the identi…ed sets B based on the SEE restrictions and compares them to those under the KKM restrictions. 4 By design, the e prod;t shocks generated by the SEE restrictions, displayed in red, should be less than 2:45 standard deviations in 1990:08, corresponding to the median value inB in 1990:08. In fact, on that date, 49 solutions have a supply shock less than 5 standard deviations. Moreover, this is the only date in the solution sets that exhibit values for e prod;t that are smaller than negative …ve standard deviations. By way of comparison, the KKM restrictions also identify large negative supply shocks in the month of the Kuwait invasion.
On the other hand, the spotlighted area in Figure 4 around the OPEC collapse shows that the KKM restrictions produce no big positive oil supply shocks at any time during this episode.
This implication of the KKM restrictions appears empirically implausible on the basis of a broadly-shared ex post understanding of the OPEC collapse. Indeed, both KM2 and Hamilton (2013) agree that Saudi Arabia created a major positive "shock" to the ‡ow supply of oil between the end of 1985 and the middle of 1986, which contributed to a large drop in its price. These …ndings underscore how identi…cation schemes derived exclusively from attention to parameter restrictions may miss valuable clues from the data that can help evaluate the validity of the identifying restrictions. 
OPEC Collapse
The …gure shows all shocks in the solution set that are at least 2 standard deviations above/below the unconditional mean from the solution set for system X t = ( prod t ; rea t ; rpo t ) 0 under KKM and SEE restrictions listed in Table 1 . The thin vertical line shows the date 1990:08 and the shaded vertical bar shows the range of dates associated with the OPEC collapse, 1985:12-1986:06. The horizontal line corresponds to 3 standard deviations above/below the unconditional mean of each series. The sample spans the period 1973:02 to 2004:09.
in 1990:08.
We close this section by investigating possible reasons why the MSW point estimate diverges so much from the set-identi…ed results under the SEE restrictions. MSW use the oil shortfall series OS t as an external instrument for identifying e prod;t , which explicitly imposes the exogeneity assumption that OS t be uncorrelated with both e rpo;t and e rea;t . The solution sets given by the SEE restrictions impose no such assumption but are free to recover it if they are consistent with those restrictions. Figure 5 presents The …gure displays histograms for all values of correlations between oil shortfall and global demand shock (top panel) and correlations between oil shortfall and oil speci…c demand shock (bottom panel) in an solution set for system X t = ( prod t ; rea t ; rpo t ) 0 under SEE restriction listed in 
Application 2: Monetary Policy and Financial Markets
In this section we consider an SVAR application based on the baseline speci…cation in Gertler and Karadi (2015) (GK hereafter), which studies role of monetary policy shocks on the aggregate economy. The GK system is comprised of the following variables: X t = (i t ; cpi t ; ip t ; ebp t ) 0 ;
where i t is a "policy indicator," measured here as the one-year Treasury bill (t-bill) rate, cpi t is the log of the Consumer Price Index, ip t is the log of industrial production, and ebp t is the excess bond premium (EBP) of Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) , a measure of credit spreads.
Let the four structural shocks of the SVAR be collected into the vector e t = (e i;t ; e cpi;t ; e ip;t ; e ebp;t ) 0 :
The …rst shock, e i;t , is the monetary policy shock of interest. This shock is the component of the VAR forecast error for i t that is uncorrelated with the other structural shocks in the SVAR. We refer to e cpi;t ; e ip;t ; and e ebp;t as "non-policy"shocks.
The objective in GK is to identify e i;t and trace out its dynamic e¤ects on …nancial market variables such as ebp t . To do so, they construct the di¤erence in the price of the 3-month fed funds futures contract between 20 minutes after and 10 minutes before a Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announcement. Since these are surprise movements in the fed funds futures price in tight windows of monetary policy announcements, they are arguably attributable to monetary policy. The VAR requires monthly data, so GK turn the futures surprises on FOMC days into monthly average surprises by allocating them between consecutive calendar months based on when they happened within the calendar month. 5 This monthly variable (denoted FF4 in GK) is the external instrument and will be denoted Z t below. GK then point identify the policy shock e i;t by maintaining the following assumptions:
Restriction (3) requires Z t to have a non-zero correlation with the policy shock it identi…es, implying that the instrument must be relevant. Restriction (4) requires Z t to be uncorrelated with all the other shocks in the system, implying that the instrument must be exogenous.
At this point it is useful to note that the term exogenous has di¤erent meanings in di¤erent contexts. It is reasonable to assume, as GK do, that innovations in the fed funds futures prices on FOMC days capture "exogenous" movements in Federal Reserve policy in the sense that they are not in ‡uenced by macroeconomic and …nancial conditions around tight windows of FOMC announcements. The restrictions in (4), however, require a type of exogeneity with a di¤erent connotation. Speci…cally, they require that the innovations in fed funds futures prices around FOMC announcements in a month have no contemporaneous in ‡uence on the forecast errors of the non-policy variables, except insofar as they a¤ect e i;t .
While the assumptions inherent in (4) are a reasonable starting place, relaxing them is of interest for at least two reasons. First, a number of authors have argued that …nancial variables other than short-term Treasury rates serve as additional policy indicators that capture distinct channels of monetary policy transmission (e.g., Gagnon, Raskin, Remache and Sack (2011), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2013), Swanson (2017) ). If true, the exogeneity assumption (4) for variables such as ebp t may be overly strong, since credit spreads are likely to re ‡ect disparate policy transmission channels not captured by short-term interest rates. Second, the time-aggregation required to turn futures market surprises on FOMC days into monthly average surprises makes the exogeneity assumptions less tenable. For example, an FOMC announcement that occurs in the middle of the month must be assumed to have no relation with the non-policy shocks e cpi;t ; e ip;t ; e ebp;t at any time within that month, including the two weeks following the announcement. If monetary policy has e¤ects that operate through channels orthogonal to short-term interest rates, e.g., if they a¤ect other assets which in turn quickly a¤ect investment plans and/or credit spreads, the exogeneity restriction (4) would be invalid. According to either reason, (4) could be relaxed. The …rst reason suggests that variables such as ebp t should be included in a vector of policy indicators along with i t . In this case, there would no longer be a single policy shock e i;t in the system but instead a vector of policy shocks (e i;t ; e ebp;t ) 0 , while the scalar parameter would become a two dimensional vector .
The second reason suggests that any shock e cpi;t ; e ip;t ; e ebp;t could possibly be correlated with Z t contemporaneously. In either case, the external instrumental variable approach to point estimation can no longer be implemented because, with only a single instrument Z t , the system is now under-identi…ed. While this renders the external instrument approach inoperative, it is not a problem for the shock-restricted approach, which obviates the need for the exogeneity restrictions. The challenge with the shock-restricted approach is to …nd other credible identifying restrictions capable of substantively winnowing the number of solutions inB. In the next section we illustrate how di¤erent types of shock-based restrictions can be used to generate solution sets that still give a fairly clear picture of the dynamic causal e¤ects of e i;t shocks in the GK system.
Motivating Facts
Since we are interested in understanding monetary policy shocks that a¤ect short-term interest rates, it is useful to isolate historical episodes characterized by quantitatively large monetary policy e¤ects on these rates. To do so, we turn to a famous historical record of such shocks that is based on the Greenbook residual series presented in Romer and Romer (2004) . The
Greenbook residuals show changes in the "intended" federal funds rate not taken in response to Federal Reserve Greenbook forecasts about in ‡ation or real growth, formed by taking the residuals from a multivariate regression of the intended funds rate on the Greenbook forecasts.
A negative (positive) residual indicates a negative (positive) monetary policy surprise. To locate quantitatively large policy surprises, we isolate dates for which these Greenbook residuals were either greater than the 95th percentile value of their sample observations, or less than the 5th percentile value. We refer to the dates that satisfy these criteria as the GB95 dates (big tightenings) and the GB05 dates (big easings), respectively.
Next we investigate whether these dates correspond to "big shock"events using the covariance structure restrictions alone. Searching over the 1.5 million rotations inB for each of the GB05 dates, we …nd that the date with the most minima of e i;t (i.e., the most surprise easings)
is 1981:10. This is also the date in the full sample with the most minima of e i;t . The date in the GB05 subsample with the second most minima is 2001:11. (In the full sample this is the date with the third most minima.) Likewise, if we search over the rotations inB for each of the GB95 dates, we …nd that the date with the most maxima (i.e., the most surprise tightenings)
is 1981 The collapse in the market over this period has been associated with a broad-based …nancial crisis that is often cited as a "trigger" of the Great Recession. We argue that these dates are likely to be associated with a sharp increase in credit spreads, thereby justifying restrictions on the behavior of e ebt;t during these months of the …nancial crisis.
Shock-Based Constraints
Motivated by the historical facts just discussed, we now consider two types of shock-based restrictions summarized in the Table below . For ease of reference, the …rst row re-stipulates the restrictions used in GK and labels the "GK restrictions." We use the fed funds futures surprise FF4 series as S t for this application. The constraints labeled S1 employ two external variable inequality constraints g C 1 0 and g C 2 0 that require S t = FF4 t to be positively correlated with both e i;t and e ebp;t . Though we do not treat FF4 t 
g Z = 0 covariance restrictions g C1 : corr(S t ; e i;t ) 0 S t = FF4 t g C2 : corr(S t ; e ebp;t ) 0 S2 S1 g C3 : jcorr (S t ; e cpi;t )j = 10 4 g C4 : jcorr (S t ; e ip;t )j SEE S1 g E1 : e ebp, 1 k 1 _ e ebp, 2 k 2 1 =2008:09, 2 = 2008:10 (Lehman Collapse) k 1 = q 75 (e ebp; 1 ); k 2 = q 75 (e edp; 2 ) g E2 : e i; 3 k 3 and e i; 4 k 4 3 =1981:05, 4 =1987:05 (Monetary Tightenings) k 3 = q 75 (e i; 3 ); k 4 = q 75 (e i; 4 ) g E3 : e i; 5 k 5 and e i; 6 k 6 5 =1981:10, 6 =2001:11 (Monetary Easings) k 5 = q 25 (e i; 5 ); k 6 = q 25 (e i; 6 ) SEE(a) k 3 = q 50 (e i; 3 ), k 4 = q 50 (e i; 4 ) k 5 = q 25 (e i; 5 ); k 6 = q 25 (e i; 6 ) SEE(b) k 3 = q 75 (e i; 3 ); k 4 = q 75 (e i; 4 ) k 5 = q 50 (e i; 5 ), k 6 = q 50 (e i; 6 )
as a valid instrument, it must be at least weakly correlated with both shocks to address the concern that monetary policy might operate through multiple …nancial indicators and channels. The constraints under S2 use all the constraints in S1 and add two more external variable constraints, labeled g C3 and g C4 . One would expect FF4 t to be approximately uncorrelated contemporaneously with the shocks of "slower moving" macro variables, even if such an assumption is unrealistic for …nancial market variables such as the EBP. Thus constraints g C3 and g C4 require that the contemporaneous relation between e cpi;t and S t , and between e ip;t and S t to be very small, though not numerically zero, implying that FF4 t is assumed to be approximately exogenous with respect to these variables. The results we present below are robust with values of as large as about 0.008. We present results for much smaller values. The models denoted SEE, SEE(a), and SEE(b) add event inequality constraints, but do away with constraints g C3 and g C4 that restrict the correlations between FF4 t and e cpi;t and e ip;t to both be close to zero. SEE uses the constraints in S1 and adds g E 1 ; g E 2 ; and g E3 . Event The …gure plots the time series of one-year tbill rate i (12) t , Romer and Romer (2004) Greenbook residuals, and all shocks that are at least 2 standard deviations above/below the unconditional mean from the unconstrained set for system X t = i inequality constraint g E 1 0 requires that the EBP credit spread shock be large and exceed k 1 and k 2 standard deviations above the mean in either 1 = 2008:09 or 2 = 2008:10 (or both), for these months associated with the Lehman collapse and its immediate aftermath. Event inequality constraint g E 2 0 requires that the monetary policy shock exceed k 3 and k 4 standard deviations above the mean during months 3 = 1981:05 and 4 = 1987:05, respectively, when the Greenbook residuals were unusually large and positive. Event inequality constraint g E 3 0 requires that the monetary policy shocks be smaller than k 5 and k 6 standard deviations below the mean during months 5 = 1981:10 and 6 = 2001:11, respectively, when the Greenbook residuals were unusually small. The alternatives listed in SEE(a) and SEE(b) use di¤erent parameterizations of the parameters k 3k 6 that control how large a "big" monetary policy shock must be and will be discussed below.
Results for the Monetary Policy SVAR
We follow GK and set the VAR lag to be 12 months. Where available, we use the same monthly data used by GK and otherwise stick to their sample dates, which spans the period 1979:07 to 2012:06. 7 Although the VAR variables are available over this sample, the external variable FF4 t is available only from 1991:01 onward. We therefore follow GK and use the full sample 1979:07 to 2012:06 to estimate the reduced-form VAR, but impose g C1g C4 only for the post 1991 subsample. We focus on the dynamic response of the EBP to a monetary policy shock, the main object of interest in GK. All …gures show IRFs to a one standard deviation change in e i;t in the direction that raises i t . For reference, the …gures also display the GK point estimated IRFs.
To assess how the di¤erent constraints a¤ect the identi…ed impulse response functions, we begin with the impulse responses under restrictions SC1 which allow both e ebp;t and e i;t to be correlated with S t , but do away with all of the exogeneity restrictions. The IRFs, plotted in the upper left panel of Figure 7 , evidently are wholly uninformative and include both positive and negative responses of credit spreads to an impulse in e i;t .
We now employ additional constraints to shrink the set. The …rst case is SC2, which adds g C3 and g C4 to SC1 to allow e cpi;t and e ip;t but not e ebp;t to have small correlation with S t . The IRFs using the SC2 restrictions are shown as gray shaded areas in the upper left panel of Figure 7 . The responses of this set are now highly informative as all responses in the set show that a positive impulse to e i;t drives up the EBP sharply. These results are similar to those produced by the GK point estimate, but obtained under weaker restrictions that permit e ebp;t to be contemporaneously correlated with S t = FF4 t . From the last result, it is evident that constraints g C3 and g C4 have substantial identifying power. But they require that S t =FF4 t to have close to zero contemporaneous relation with the structural shocks to in ‡ation and production. We now eliminate these restrictions and instead replace them with the event inequality constraints g E1 ; g E2 and g E3 . To implement these SEE constraints, we need to set the parameters k = k 1 ; :::; k 6 0 . We start by setting k 1 and k 2 to the 75th percentile values of e ebp, 1 and e ebp, 2 inB, respectively, and k 3 and k 4 equal to the 75th percentile values of e i, 3 and e i, 4 inB; respectively. Thus a "big" positive shock is one in the top 75% of all shocks inB at event 1 corresponding to the Lehman collapse, and at event 2 corresponding to the big monetary tightening. For the big monetary easing events named in g E3 , we set k 5 ; k 6 to the 25th percentile values of e i; 5 and e i; 6 inB in periods 5 and 6 when there were big negative Greenbook residuals.
The upper right panel of Figure 7 shows the IRFs for dynamic responses under the SEE con- The …gure reports solution set of impulse response to positive, one standard deviation shocks for system X t = (i t ; cpi t ; ip t ; ebp t ) 0 under restrictions S1, S2, GK, SEE, SEE(a) and SEE(b) listed in Table 2 . The sample spans the period 1979:07 to 2012:06. straints. Only 234 solutions satisfy these constraints but they are highly informative and show that a positive impulse in e i;t sharply increases credit spreads, as measured by the EBP, which remain elevated for many months. These results are qualitatively similar to those produced by the GK point estimate, lending support to the GK identifying restrictions.
We now consider the sensitivity of the results to the parameters k. Case SEE(a) sets k 3 and k 4 to the median value of e i;t at 3 ; 4 so that the big shocks are smaller than the ones in Is this asymmetry speci…c to the shock-restricted approach? To address this question we return to the GK external instrumental variable point-identi…cation scheme, but instead of using Z t = FF4 t as an instrument, as in GK, we consider two alternative instruments. In the …rst case we set Z t = FF4 t I ( FF4 t <0), where I ( FF4 t <0) is an indicator variable that equals one if the surprise movement in the futures rate on FOMC days is negative (i.e., a surprise easing), and zero otherwise. In the second case we set Z t = FF4 t I ( FF4 t >0), where
is an indicator variable that equals one if the surprise movements in the futures rate on FOMC days is positive (i.e., a surprise tightening), and zero otherwise. Figure 8 shows the IRFs obtained under these identi…cation schemes, along with the GK point estimate that uses Z t =FF4 t . It is immediately evident that the IRFs obtained using Z t = FF4 t I ( FF4 t <0)
are almost identical to those produced with Z t = FF4 t . By contrast, the results using Z t = FF4 t I ( FF4 t >0) di¤er dramatically and imply that a positive monetary policy shock has a negligible impact on the EBP at all horizons and moreover has the "wrong" (negative) sign in the short-run. Thus much like the shock-restricted sets of IRFs in the bottom panels of Figure 7 , the identifying power of the restrictions in this point-identi…ed case appears largely attributable to monetary easings, with monetary tightenings playing little role. 8 
Application 3: Housing Wealth and Consumption
As a …nal application we consider a VAR inspired by the work of Mian and Su… (2014) The shock restricted SVAR methodology o¤ers a potential resolution to this dilemma without requiring the use of an instrument that may not be credibly exogenous. To illustrate this point, we consider a bivariate VAR and use shock-based restrictions to winnow the set of solutions that are consistent with mutually uncorrelated shocks to housing and consumption.
Consider an SVAR with two variables: X t = ( lnC t ; lnH t ) 0 ; where lnC t is the log change But this result too is entirely attributable to the monetary easings. The variable Z t = FF4 t I ( FF4 t <0) delivers an F statistic equal to 19.78, while Z t = FF4 t I ( FF4 t >0) generates an F statistic equal to 2. in real personal consumption expenditures for the aggregate U.S. economy, and lnH t is the log change in real housing wealth (de ‡ated by PCE de ‡ator). Our objective is to identify a set of mutually uncorrelated structural shocks e t = (e C;t ; e H;t ) 0 ;
where e C;t refers to the consumption shock, and e H;t to the housing shock. Movements in e H;t represent unforecastable changes in housing wealth that are not a response to changes in consumption. These shocks may therefore be used to estimate the dynamic causal e¤ects of an impulse to housing wealth on aggregate consumption.
The possible role of housing wealth in driving aggregate ‡uctuations has become a subject of special interest as economists ponder the possible factors that lead to the Great Recession, a protracted economic downturn that overlapped with a global …nancial crisis and a dramatic boom-bust cycle in residential real estate prices. It is now widely accepted that the period of rapid home price appreciation from 2002 to 2006 was associated with a wide-spread relaxation of mortgage lending standards accompanied by declining credit spreads, lower …nancial market risk premia, and easier …nancial conditions. Conversely, the housing bust that started some time in 2007 accompanied by a global …nancial crisis was associated with a sharp increase in credit spreads and a tightening of …nancial conditions. 9
With this historical backdrop in mind, we consider a shock-restricted identi…cation strategy to recover e t = (e C;t ; e H;t ) 0 . For this application we use a single external variable inequality constraint that requires housing shocks to have a non-zero correlation of the "right"sign with measures of credit spreads or …nancial conditions. We use two separate external variables for this purpose, employed as alterative measures of …nancial conditions one at a time. The …rst, denoted EBP t is the EBP variable used in the previous application. The second, denoted FCI t , is the National Financial Conditions Index constructed by the Chicago Federal Reserve. The …rst is a measure of risk premia in credit markets; the second is a measure of the tightness of …nancial conditions.
Shock-Based Constraints
According to the economic history just described, house price movements should be correlated with aggregate …nancial conditions, with positive (negative) house price shocks associated with looser (tighter) …nancial conditions and narrower (wider) credit spreads. This motivates the following restrictions. 9 For empirical evidence on lending standards during this period see (Favilukis, Kohn, Ludvigson and Van Nieuwerburgh (2013) and Jordà, Schularick and Taylor (2017) ). For a theoretical model that shows how relaxed lending standards lower risk premia and raise house prices, see (Favilukis, Ludvigson and Van Nieuwerburgh (2017) ). We consider several sets of alternative restrictions. The …rst row refers to the covariance restrictions alone. The restrictions in the rows labeled Recursive (a) and Recursive (b) refer to the two possible recursive identi…cation schemes that may be employed for this system. In SEE(a) and SEE(b) we apply the external variable restriction using either EBP t or FCI t . That is, we apply the constraints one at a time to investigate the sensitivity of the …ndings to a particular S t . The restriction requires that a positive housing wealth shock be associated with lower credit market risk premia and looser …nancial conditions. Conversely, a negative housing wealth shock must be associated with higher risk premia and tighter …nancial conditions. Note that there is nothing in the external variable constraints that explicitly precludes a non-zero correlation between the consumption shock e C;t and these measures of …nancial conditions. Nor is there anything that restricts the relative importance of the two shocks in any particular episode.
Finally, the row labeled ADRR considers the "narrative sign" type restrictions introduced in Antolín-Díaz and Rubio-Ramírez (2018). As discussed above, the restrictions considered in Antolín-Díaz and Rubio-Ramírez (2018) di¤er from those here in two ways. First, they entertain event restrictions that play up the role of some shocks while simultaneously playing down the role of others (e.g., their "Type A and B"restrictions on the historical decompositions), similar in spirit to the traditional narrative-external instrument approach. Second, they do not use external variables at all. Thus to use their approach we need at least one event. For this purpose we consider the U.S. banking panic that occurred in the third and fourth quarters of 2007. The historical chronology of this panic and its speci…c link to an adverse housing "shock" has been extensively documented by Gorton (2008) , Gorton (2009) , and Gorton and Metrick (2012) , who argue that the panic began August 2007 and continued for the rest of that year. The constraints labeled ADRR impose both a sign restriction on e H;t in 2007:Q3 and 2007:Q4 requiring that the sum of the housing shocks in these two periods be negative, which is to say below average, as well as a Type A/B historical decomposition restriction, requiring that contribution of e H;t to the observed log change in consumption in 2007:Q3 and 2007:Q4 exceed that of e C;t . 10 Note that this latter event constraint di¤ers from those considered in the previous applications since it explicitly requires some shocks to play smaller roles than others in this episode.
Results for the Housing Application
For this application our data are quarterly and we use the largest common sample available for observations on consumption growth, housing wealth growth, and the …nancial variables used as external variables. This leaves us with a sample that spans the period 1973:Q1 to 2016:Q4. A more detailed description of the data and our sources is provided in the Online Appendix. We estimate the VAR using four quarterly lags. Since the data for this VAR are in log di¤erences, the IRF …gures below display the cumulative responses of consumption growth to a one standard deviation increase in e H;t . Figure 9 shows the solution sets of IRFs. We focus …rst on the sets of responses obtained by imposing only the covariance structure restrictions g Z (B) = 0. In the absence of additional identifying assumptions it is di¢ cult to assign an interpretation to the shocks, but the case is useful as a benchmark.
Next we add external variable restrictions to shrink the admissible set. The IRFs obtained by imposing SEE(a) are shown in the top panel; those obtained by imposing SEE(b) are shown in the bottom panel. We see that the restrictions greatly narrowed the range of possible responses compared to those based only on g Z (B) = 0, and in both cases they show that a positive housing wealth shock drives up consumption sharply and persistently, with all solutions in the identi…ed sets displaying this pattern. The bounds using EBP t are particularly tight.
The results imply that when a positive housing wealth shock is associated with declining credit spreads and looser …nancial conditions, or conversely when a negative housing wealth shock is associated with rising credit spreads and tighter …nancial conditions, it a¤ects aggregate consumer spending. This aspect of the …ndings echo those in Krishnamurthy and Muir (2017) .
The application shows that, even without valid instruments, fairly clear conclusions can be drawn about the causal e¤ects of housing on aggregate consumption.
The IRFs obtained under the ADRR restrictions are presented in red dashed lines of Figure  9 . The sets are much wider than those under the SEE restrictions. The upper bound of the It is instructive to also consider the IRFs that would be obtained if this system were point-identi…ed using a recursive identi…cation scheme. Note that the assumptions embedded in the shock-restricted SVAR do not rule out the possibility of a recursive structure, so the estimation is free to recover one if such a structure is consistent with the restrictions. With two variables in the SVAR, there are two possible recursive orderings, hence two possible point estimates of B. The IRFs implied by these two point-identi…ed models are shown in Figure 9 as di¤erent colored dashed lines.
The results show that, under either recursive ordering, the impact of a housing shock on consumption is estimated to be close to zero at most horizons, implying that housing shocks have little role to play in aggregate consumption ‡uctuations. Furthermore, both point-identi…ed solutions are outside the range of values suggested by the shock-restricted SVAR. An examination shows why: under either recursive ordering, the identi…ed e H;t is found to be positively rather than negatively correlated with both EBP t and FCI t , a property that is ruled out by assumption by the SEE restrictions. Given our ex post understanding of events in a sample that included unusually large house price ‡uctuations, it is doubtful that a positive correlation between these variables is sensible. To have con…dence in those identi…cation schemes, one would have to believe that positive housing wealth shocks that were explicitly not a response to changes in consumption coincided with higher risk premia and tighter …nancial conditions, while negative housing wealth shocks coincided with a relaxation of lending standards and looser …nancial conditions. Consider …rst the SEE(a) restrictions. As Figure 10 indicates, housing shocks played a substantial role in driving aggregate consumption ‡uctuations in the housing bust, but their role in the housing boom is unclear. For the boom period, the demeaned log di¤erence in consumption was just 0.20% at an annual rate, while the contribution of e H;t ranges anywhere from -0.27% and 0.28%. The role of the consumption shocks in driving consumption during the boom is also unclear, with the contribution of e C;t ranging from -0.08% to 0.47%. This may be because consumption growth was fairly typical in this subperiod, exceeding its historical mean by only a small magnitude. By contrast, for the period 2007:Q1-2011:Q4, the demeaned log di¤erence in consumption was -2.22% at an annual rate with the estimated contribution of e H;t ranging from -2.32% to -1.31%, indicating that housing shocks explained anywhere from 105% to 60% of the aggregate consumption decline during the housing bust. The range of contributions of the consumption shocks, on the other hand, ranges from -0.91% to 0.10%, making their role again unclear. For the entire boom-bust subsample 2002:Q1 to 2011:Q4 where variation was dominated by the bust, the demeaned log di¤erence in consumption was -1.01% at an annual rate and the contribution of housing shocks ranges from -1.12% to -0.79%. We conclude that housing played a potentially large role in the sharp declines in aggregate consumption that were characteristic of the Great Recession, but an unclear role in the housing boom years. The results using the ADRR restrictions are less clear overall. The …ndings are similar to those under the SEE(a) restrictions for the boom period. In this case the contribution of e H;t ranges anywhere from -0.29% and 0.28%, while the contribution of e C;t ranges from -0.08% to 0.49%. But in contrast to the results under the SEE(a) restrictions, the ADRR restrictions suggest that a wide range of contributions from housing shocks were possible during the bust period, with the contribution of e H;t ranging from -2.32% to -0.17%, indicating that housing shocks explained anywhere from 8% to 105% of aggregate consumption ‡uctuations. This contrast with the results using the SEE restrictions is not surprising given the wider solution sets shown in Figure 9 .
Conclusion
Identifying assumptions need to be imposed in order to give impulse responses generated by vector autoregressions an economically meaningful interpretation. But in many cases the assumptions required for point identi…cation may be overly strong, while commonly used set-identi…ed approaches are often not rich enough to conclude that the data are consistent with a clear causal pattern among the variables. In this paper we explore the properties of a new type of restrictions based on moment inequalities that can help winnow the range of plausible solutions. The restrictions take the form of constraining the structural shocks rather than the parameters of a VAR. To illustrate the potential uses of the approach, we consider two types of restrictions adapted to three applications. The …rst type restricts the sign and magnitude of identi…ed shocks in speci…c episodes of history so that they accord with a broad historical understanding of events at particular points in the sample. The second restricts the correlations between the identi…ed shocks and variables that are external to the VAR. Monte Carlo methods are used to get a sense of sampling variability. The issue of how to best conduct frequentist inference in shock-restricted SVARs remains an important topic for future research. Most existing empirical work using vector autoregressions focuses closely on the set of theoretical restrictions that may be defensibly placed on the SVAR parameters to achieve identi-…cation. But the structural shocks implied by the chosen identi…cation scheme, which are the product of both the data and the restricted parameter vector, are rarely scrutinized. We contend that this focus often misses valuable clues from the data that may be highly informative about the shocks of interest, for two reasons. First, the applications studied here demonstrate that the shocks are additional empirical objects of interest, no matter what the identi…cation scheme. In some cases, the shocks obtained by identi…cation schemes derived exclusively from attention to parameter restrictions appear implausible given an ex post understanding of major historical or economic events. Second, any model that may be written as a VAR provides n(n+1)=2 restrictions from the covariance structure, thereby yielding a set of admissible shocks that are a product of the data alone. This set can be employed directly as part of the shockrestricted approach discussed here to provide additional evidence on major economic events of the sample, before any identifying restrictions are imposed.
Appendix for Online Publication

Data Description
Oil Application Data for the system X t = ( prod t , rea t , rpo t ) 0 are obtained from the data …le of Kilian (2009) at URL:https://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/june09/20070211_data.zip. prod t is the percentage change in global crude oil production, rea t is the global demand of industrial commodities variable constructed in Kilian (2009) and rpo t is the real oil price.
For this application we also use Killian's (2008) measure of "exogenous oil supply shocks"
as an external variable. The variable measures shortfalls in OPEC oil production associated with wars and civil disruptions. This indicator is used as an external instrument for point identifying oil price shocks in Montiel-Olea et al. (2015) .
We use the same data used in Kilian (2009) and the largest common sample period across Kilian (2008) and Kilian (2009 Kilian ( ) (1973 Kilian ( :02-2004 :09) for the analysis.
Monetary Policy Application
Both the data for the system X t = i (12) t ; cpi t ; ip t ; ebp t 0 and the data for the external variable Fed funds futures FF4 are obtained from the data and code …le of Gertler and Karadi (2015) at URL:https://www.aeaweb.org/aej/mac/data/0701/2013-0329_data.zip. For the analysis in the paper, we use the same data used by GK and otherwise stick to their sample dates. The sample is monthly and spans the period 1979:07 to 2012:06.
The Greenbook residuals are constructed in Romer and Romer (2004) . where T R m is the change in the target rate at meeting m from the last meeting, g m;k is the k-horizon forecast of real output growth released at meeting m, m;k is the k-horizon forecast of in ‡ation released at meeting m, and u m;0 is the current forecast of the unemployment rate at meeting m.
We obtained the Greenbook historical forecast data on real GDP, in ‡ation, and unemployment rate from the Philadelphia Fed's Greenbook Data Set (URL:https://www.philadelphiafed.
org/research-and-data/real-time-center/greenbook-data/philadelphia-data-set). We replicated the Romer and Romer (2004) Residuals over the sample 1979:07 to 1996:12. We then used the same estimation equation and extended the residuals to 2012:06.
